The term "illegal price manipulation" is difficult to define. Current U.S. law does not explicitly define it. The finance and economics literature uses the term "manipulation" in an imprecise manner. This paper proposes that a trading strategy not be classified as "illegal price manipulation" unless the violator's intent is to pursue a scheme that undermines economic efficiency both by making prices less accurate as signals for efficient resource allocation and by making markets less liquid for risk transfer. Since price effects are market-wide, we treat the terms "price manipulation" and "market manipulation" as synonyms. Our definition applies equally to financial and commodities markets. 
Benign strategies include restricting the quantity traded to avoid price impact (Albert S. Kyle (1985) , Kyle (1989) ), using mixed strategies which involve both buying and selling to minimize transactions costs (F. Douglas Foster and S. Viswanathan (1994) , Kerry Back and Shmuel Baruch (2003) ), bluffing (Jos van Bommel (2003) ), inter-temporal market depth arbitrage (Fischer Black (1995) ), and "punching the close" (Kyle (2007) ). Our definition distinguishes between these harmful and benign strategies.
Our definition is consistent with both U.S.
case law and the recent UK and EU principlesbased codes of conduct. Although failure to make required disclosures or making false disclosures may be illegal manipulation, the concept of illegal manipulation includes non-deceptive strategies such as setting up a public cartel to control supplies of a manipulated commodity.
In the rest of this paper, we discuss how imperfect competition, private information, and network externalities motivate our definition of price manipulation; show that traditional types of illegal price manipulation, such as corners and squeezes and pump-and-dump schemes, are consistent with our definition; discuss how our definition is consistent with the legal approach to manipulation in the US and Europe; and discuss enforcement issues.
I. What is Illegal Price
Manipulation?
Definitions of price manipulation have long reflected a tension between subjective approaches ("the smell test")and more scientific approaches based on economic efficiency (see Adam Smith (1776) Pagano and Ailsa Roell (1996) ). Liquidity traders are hedgers who are willing to pay for a risk-transfer service or naively overconfident traders who expect to make profits but will actually lose money on average; informed traders are sophisticated entities like hedge funds who make money on average. Kyle (1985) and Kyle (1989) show how 
II. Traditional Examples of Illegal Manipulation
Both corners and squeezes, as well as pumpan-dump schemes, are illegal price manipulation.
In a corner or squeeze, the manipulator obtains a dominant position in the asset sufficient to make it costly for traders with short positions to acquire the asset for the purpose of In a "reverse" corner or squeeze, the perpetrator makes it difficult for the market to absorb supplies of the manipulated asset by flooding the market with collateral and driving down prices.
It is difficult to implement a reverse corner or squeeze of a financial asset, since all that is required to "store" a financial asset is access to credit, which is usually widely available. Reverse corners and squeezes are more realistic possibilities for expensive-to-store commodities like oil and electricity.
In a pump-and-dump manipulation scheme, 
III. Consistency with Legal Approach to Manipulation
Consistent with Adam Smith's (1776) view that actions motivated by self-interest can benefit the common good, the legal system in market economies recognizes that market participants often trade for selfish motives that are socially beneficial, not intrinsically illegal. The legal system recognizes that "manipulation" or "market abuse" tends to undermine the social benefits that markets provide, but it has been difficult for legal systems to describe specifically which practices constitute illegal manipulation. In the US, the law prohibits manipulation but leaves it to the courts to define it on a case-by-case basis. The UK and the EU have recently proposed a principles-based description of prohibited manipulative practices.
Case-law in the US implements a four-part test involving ability intent, causation, and arti- Another class of examples can be classified as "market depth arbitrage." Kyle (1985) presents a model where in equilibrium, market depth must be constant because, if it is not, a trader can make large profits inconsistent with equilibrium by trading very aggressively either to add noise to prices or to make prices very accurate (see also Black (1995) ). Such strategies are not illegal manipulation because they tend to increase market liquidity, at least during some trading periods, protecting naive traders who might otherwise trade at times of low liquidity.
Related to these strategies is so-called "preda- 
V. Conclusion
We have argued that "illegal price manipulation" occurs only when the two fundamental roles of prices in financial markets are distorted -allocational efficiency that relates to market informativeness and transactional efficiency that relates to market liquidity. Our definition is con-sistent with US case law and UK and EU codes of conduct. It rules out corners and squeezes, as well as pump-and-dump schemes. It allows bluffing, randomizing, spreading true rumors, and punching the close. It recognizes that illegal trade-based manipulation is difficult both to define and to prosecute.
